In 2025, discussions surrounding “competitive authoritarianism” were prevalent in Foreign Affairs. A co-authored paper by Professor Steven Levitsky of Harvard University’s Latin American Studies and Professor of Government and Professor Lucan A. Way of the University of Toronto’s Department of Political Science, “The Path to American Authoritarianism  What Comes After Democratic Breakdown” (March/April 2025), and another co-authored paper by Levitsky and Harvard University Professor Daniel Ziblatt, “ The Price of American Authoritarianism  What Can Reverse Democratic Decline?” (January/February 2026). Regarding the former, as the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have argued in Foreign Affairs, the United States is sliding into competitive authoritarianism, this statement appears in an article by Elizabeth N. Sanders, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, titled “ Imperial President at Home, Emperor Abroad  American Foreign Policy in an Age of Unrestrained Executive Power,” published on June 16.

This time, I wish to introduce these arguments while offering criticism. To be blunt, the American scholars I cited present crude analyses lacking philosophical insight. It is precisely this world where such individuals wield “authority” that deserves our critique. Unless we challenge incompetent scholars, we only increase the number of people deceived by them—and who in turn deceive others.

 

Levitsky et al.’s “Competitive Authoritarianism”

First, I would like to introduce Levitsky et al.’s definition of “competitive authoritarianism.” It refers to a political system where “substantive democratic institutions coexist with severe abuse of power by incumbents, and electoral competition exists but produces unfair outcomes.” According to their joint work Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2010), “this system is competitive in the sense that opposition actors utilize democratic institutions to earnestly pursue political power, but it is not democratic because the conditions of competition are distorted in favor of the incumbent.”

According to the Levitsky and Way paper introduced earlier, most of the authoritarian states that emerged after the Cold War—such as Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, and contemporary El Salvador, Hungary, India, Tunisia, and Turkey—fall into this category. Under competitive authoritarianism, the formal structures of democracy, including multiparty elections, remain intact. Opposition forces are legitimate and grounded, seriously contesting power. Incumbents can lose, as seen in Malaysia in 2018 and Poland in 2023. However, they point out as follows.

“But the system is not democratic, because incumbents rig the game by deploying the machinery of government to attack opponents and co-opt critics. Competition is real but unfair.”

Furthermore, the two predicted that the second Trump administration “could infringe upon fundamental civil liberties in ways that clearly undermine democracy,” adding that “much of the authoritarianism to come will take the less visible form of politicizing and weaponizing the government bureaucracy.”

President Donald Trump has been dismantling rules and norms designed to prevent presidential abuse of power and is attempting to establish rule based on his own authority. For example, he could suspend or abolish rules such as Senate confirmation of presidential appointees, lifetime tenure for Supreme Court justices, lifetime tenure for the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) chair, the 10-year term for the FBI director, and the 5-year term for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) commissioner, thereby expanding presidential authority. Furthermore, Trump has already resumed efforts to weaken the civil service system by reinstating the “Schedule F” executive order, which allows the president to exclude tens of thousands of government employees in positions deemed “highly confidential and involving policy decision-making, policy formulation, or policy advocacy” from civil service protections.

Furthermore, the Trump administration has deployed and utilized the Department of Justice, prosecutors’ offices, and tax and intelligence agencies to investigate and prosecute hostile politicians, media companies, editors, journalists, business leaders, universities, and other critics. In doing so, it seeks not only to suppress criticism and attacks against Trump personally, but also to prosecute and thoroughly strike down those who oppose him if necessary.

In conclusion, the two authors note that “America stands at the threshold of competitive authoritarianism,” concluding their paper with the following statement:

“But the opposition can win only if it stays in the game. Opposition under competitive authoritarianism can be grueling. Worn down by harassment and threats, many of Trump’s critics will be tempted to retreat to the sidelines. Such a retreat would be perilous. When fear, exhaustion, or resignation crowds out citizens’ commitment to democracy, emergent authoritarianism begins to take root.”

 

The Future of U.S. Politics Resembling Ukraine

In the co-authored paper “The Price of American Authoritarianism,” it is argued that “to halt the United States’ descent into authoritarianism, defenders of democracy must recognize the dual dangers of complacency and fatalism.” The danger of complacency means underestimating the threat of authoritarianism to democracy. Believing that the actions of the Trump administration are merely standard political tactics and dismissing them risks fostering inaction in the face of systematic abuse of power, potentially aiding authoritarianism. Conversely, fatalism—overestimating authoritarian influence by believing a country has reached a point of no return—can stifle the civic action needed to defeat dictators at the ballot box, ultimately allowing authoritarianism to transform into outright dictatorship.

Furthermore, he predicts that “the most likely mid-term outcome in the United States is neither the entrenchment of an authoritarian regime nor a return to stable democracy. Rather, it is the destabilization of the administration.” There, he suggests, a long-term struggle will unfold between authoritarian impulses and democratic solidarity. Specifically, it suggests that “American politics may come to resemble Ukraine in the 1990s and early 2000s.” As pro-European and pro-Russian factions alternately seize control of the administration, the United States is likely to become much like Ukraine, which oscillated between democracy and competitive authoritarianism.

 

Misunderstanding of Democracy

However, the arguments presented here by Levitsky and others are utterly insignificant. The fundamental problem lies in their treatment of democracy as a sacred banner, an infallible principle. The issue is the fact that authoritarianism or competitive authoritarianism can emerge from democracy. Viewing the subject through the lens of “democracy versus authoritarianism” makes the two appear entirely distinct. This is not the case. In truth, democracy and authoritarianism or competitive authoritarianism are not fundamentally different. What we must examine is democracy itself—how those who come to power under its banner can easily steer it toward authoritarianism or competitive authoritarianism.

Therefore, for example, the frequent claims by the “West” that it supports Ukraine to defend democracy and the rule of law in relation to the Ukraine war are entirely mistaken. Democracy is something to be critically examined, something that requires constant revision and improvement—not something to be “defended.” From this perspective, it is impossible to devise any measures to prevent democracy’s transformation into authoritarianism. To reiterate, the fundamental problem with Levitsky and others’ arguments lies in their “naivety” – their refusal to truly understand democracy itself. In other words, it stems from their feeble intellect.

 

Nietzsche’s Critique of “Democracy”

First, I would like to introduce Kazutaka Maekawa’s paper, “Nietzsche’s Critique of ‘Democracy’: Reading It as a Critique of Civilization” (Angelus Novus, 2014). In it, Maekawa states that in Haruyuki Enso’s “Is Democracy the Problem Now? —Under Nietzsche’s ‘Optics of Life’“ (Ethics Research, Vol. 32, 2002), which states: ”If you peel back the surface of democracy, what lies behind is merely a power game where power plays with power.” Maekawa points out that Enma argued Nietzsche criticized a mass society where politicians chase popular approval, citizens blindly accept newspaper opinions, and the economy lifestyle homogenization through mass production and consumption. Maekawa then states that since Nietzsche uses the term “democracy” with other meanings besides massification, he wishes to clarify that Nietzsche’s critique of ‘democracy’ is multifaceted (both Enso and Maekawa are entirely correct in focusing on Nietzsche’s critique of “democracy”).

Maekawa thus examines Nietzsche’s views on (1) Christianity and “democracy” and (2) capitalism and “democracy.” His analysis is grounded in Nietzsche’s understanding of Christianity (Note 1). Here, we briefly introduce the arguments for (1) and (2).

 

(1) Christianity and “Democracy”

Maekawa points out that, for Nietzsche, “democracy is a political system that inherits the ideals of Christianity.” In this sense, Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity becomes significant. As is well known, Nietzsche proposed that “active, aggressive, and invasive individuals” should “repeatedly snatched the objects of resentment from the hands of vengeance, sometimes forcing them to fight for peace and order instead of revenge, sometimes devising or proposing compromises, sometimes even imposing them, and sometimes elevating a certain equivalent of compensation for damages to the status of a norm, thereby compelling resentment to use this as the standard for compensation, whether it liked it or not.”

A prime example is Jesus Christ. He teaches people who think, “If I feel uncomfortable, it must be someone else’s fault,” to see powerlessness, misfortune, and suffering as proof that they are chosen and loved by God. For example, being struck on one cheek by another person inherently signifies weakness and misery. Yet, by deliberately allowing oneself to be struck and turning the other cheek, this act instead demonstrates moral superiority.

Maekawa states, “In Nietzsche, those who demand ‘sympathy’ are called the ‘herd.’” Indeed, in Fragment 199 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes: “As long as man has existed, the human herd (blood clans, communities, tribes, peoples, nations, churches) has always existed in every age, and there have always been a great many submissive individuals for every few commanders.” Furthermore, in the same fragment, Nietzsche states:

“On the other hand, today’s herd-like Europeans wear an expression as if they alone were the only permissible kind of human being, and they praise their own nature—which makes them docile, cooperative, and useful to the herd—as true human virtues. Such virtues are public spirit, kindness, consideration, diligence, modesty, humility, tolerance, and sympathy. Yet when they feel they cannot do without a leader or guiding sheep, people today strive desperately to fill the void of command by rallying the relatively clever herd-like individuals. This is the cause, for example, of all representative constitutional systems. Nevertheless, for these herd-like Europeans, the emergence of a single absolute commander is the great blessing, the great salvation that will liberate them from the unbearably oppressive predicament they find themselves in.”

Reading this, one realizes that Nietzsche recognized the “mechanism” of “sympathy” by the herd lurking within “democracy”—such as a “representative constitutional system.” At first glance, ‘democracy’ governed by “sympathy” seems a desirable phenomenon, as it eliminates distinctions like nobility and slavery, striving for equality aimed at rescuing the weak. “However, according to Nietzsche,” Maekawa points out, “once the ‘herd-like human beings’ who seek ‘sympathy’ succeed in sharing their suffering collectively, they then turn their energies toward devising ways to reduce that suffering for everyone.” For Nietzsche, this merely satisfies animalistic desires through comfortable living. “What Nietzsche truly desires,” Maekawa states, “is to inflate human desires and create new values.”

Here, desire refers to something temporary that ceases to be wanted once satisfied, whereas craving represents something constant that only intensifies upon fulfillment. Therefore, what becomes crucial after suffering is reduced is not the desire that quickly fades, but the craving that never ceases.

According to Maekawa, “In Nietzsche, the useful and diligent common man merely satisfies his desires and cannot generate will. In contrast, the ‘exceptional man possessing the most dangerous and attractive qualities’ is said to be capable not only of satisfying desires but also of generating will.” Precisely for this reason, Nietzsche states: “What I mean is this: the democratization of Europe simultaneously becomes an unwitting preparation for the cultivation of a despotic ruler—in every sense of the term, and especially in its most spiritual sense” (here, the figure evoked is none other than Napoleon).

Therefore, Nietzsche believed that “Christianity, by preaching ‘sympathy,’ seeks to share suffering among people and suppress desire.” Consequently, “when this ‘sympathy’ becomes institutionalized as ‘democracy,’ people become concerned only with reducing suffering.” Maekawa writes, “From the above, it can be said that Nietzsche expressed a negative view of ‘democracy’ not from the perspective of establishing moral norms, but from that of creating cultural values.”

Democracy prepared the ground for the rise of a “tyrannical ruler,” enabling the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nazi Party), democratically elected by the people, to seize power. Under Führer Adolf Hitler, the mass extermination of Jews was carried out. That “true moral problems arose from the actions of people who merely conformed to the system” was precisely the result of this herd being tamed under democracy. We should recall Hannah Arendt’s statement in Responsibility and Judgment: “It is not the responsibility of the criminal, but of ordinary people, that morality collapses into a mere collection of customs, degenerating into arbitrarily changeable conventions, habits, and agreements.”

 

(2) Capitalism and “Democracy”

According to Maekawa, Nietzsche regarded the era when the state was held sacred as one characterized by feudalism as an economic system and monarchy or aristocracy as a political system. Nietzsche envisioned capitalism—where contractual relations are established through wages—as the economic system succeeding feudalism. In the feudal era, there existed a “faith in unconditional authority and ultimate truth,” and even when obeying commands, a “noble attitude” was maintained. However, under capitalism, such an attitude is lost. This signifies that people have become skeptical of unconditional authority and ultimate truth. In other words, Maekawa points out, “It can be said that Nietzsche understood the era when the state ceases to be regarded as sacred to be when the economic system is capitalism.”

To summarize, Nietzsche believed that “while feudalism determined master-servant relationships and monarchies and aristocracies established class systems in medieval society, 19th-century European society saw contractual relationships formed through capitalism and equality introduced through democracy.” Whereas the economic and political center in the Middle Ages was the king and nobility, in 19th-century Europe it shifted to the masses. “However, while Nietzsche praised capitalism for liberating the desires of the masses, he criticized democracy for only fostering distrust of leaders among the populace,” Maekawa states.

For Nietzsche believed that in a democracy, once equality is introduced, the masses become nothing more than “selfish cattle and rabble.” In other words, everyone ultimately belongs to an organization and pursues their own selfish interests. Such petty individuals cannot be objects of faith, nor can they possess the dignity to lead a nation even if they become leaders. This is where the “principle of majority rule” comes into play. “However, according to Nietzsche, no matter how many individuals lacking self-assurance gather together, they cannot attain the authority necessary to control the state,” Maekawa states. On the contrary, under democracy, “rather than confidently expressing one’s own opinion, people are encouraged to humbly listen to the opinions of the surrounding majority first.” Consequently, a “national mentality of pandering to the majority opinion” emerges.

In relation to the discussion here, I wrote in my book The Depths of the Neo-Trump Revolution: “Under a class system that emphasizes origin, resignation (acceptance of different status) precedes envy. But under democracy, resignation recedes and envy takes precedence” (p. 364). This envy “stems from the very essence of democracy.” Unless we engage in a direct discussion on how to control this emotion of envy, we cannot overcome democracy’s fundamental flaw.

 

The Dishonesty of Democracy’s Believers Who Avoid Confronting Its Flaws

Viewed this way, it becomes clear that democracy, at least as underpinned by Christian theology, possesses fundamental flaws. ① It increases the number of mediocre individuals and diminishes the creativity of cultural values, ② it fosters a national mentality that panders to the majority, and ③ it allows feelings of envy to run rampant. To praise democracy as if it were infallible while ignoring these flaws is dishonest.

In truth, democracy possesses numerous other flaws. For instance, I have extensively criticized democracy in my work Imperialist America’s Ambitions, specifically in Chapter 6: American Foreign Strategy, Section 2: Democracy as Solipsism (pp. 259-267), and in The World History of Bureaucracy, Final Chapter: Corruption Issues in the 21st Century, Rebuilding Democracy (pp. 258-279).

From my perspective, pitting democracy against authoritarianism or competitive authoritarianism is largely meaningless. It may be natural to mock authoritarianism, but in truth, democracy itself deserves ridicule. For democracy is fundamentally a system of governance built on pandering to the majority, on information manipulation through baseless, arbitrary reporting by mass media, and on brainwashing through compulsory education—a system with no legitimate foundation whatsoever.

Incidentally, the term “populism” we often hear seems to have become a standard phrase for democracy advocates to attack right-wing or authoritarian opponents. However, I despise the forces that use the word ‘populism’ to criticize others. I think, “Aren’t you lot just as much populists yourselves?” Because democracy, as Nietzsche said, is inherently populist. The adoption of the “principle of majority rule” symbolizes this (in many situations, lotteries should be introduced; treating majority rule as a sacred cow is fundamentally mistaken).

 

How to View “US vs. Europe”

What is truly needed is not a perspective like “democracy vs. authoritarianism” that defends democracy while criticizing other systems of governance. What is needed is a perspective that critiques democracy itself and aims to build a more legitimate system of governance.

From this perspective, we can explain the current situation where nations that previously supported Ukraine as fellow democracies now find themselves at odds. The current “US vs. Europe” conflict cannot be understood solely through the lens of the Trump administration “standing at the threshold of competitive authoritarianism” versus democratic European nations that are not. Only by embracing a critical spirit toward democracy—recognizing it as immature, imperfect, and in need of reform—can we grasp the underlying causes of this confrontation.

In the United States, on one hand, there were old media outlets like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and CNN, which served as tools of brainwashing, deceiving a compliant populace. On the other hand, fed up with old media that openly or implicitly supported the Democratic Party, voices using social media and other platforms began to spread, directly criticizing the excessive and woke assertions of these old media. This not only ignited backlash against the overreach of “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” (DEI) but also led to criticism of U.S. foreign policy, which had been involved in exporting liberal democracy, ultimately contributing to support for Trump. It is crucial to recognize that the surge in criticism of liberal democracy was the backdrop against which pressure to withdraw from the Ukraine war intensified.

In contrast, in Europe—where traditional media has dominated and suppressed free speech on social media—it can be said that traditional media has continued to deceive complacent citizens across nations (Japan, incidentally, falls into this European category).

In other words, the “U.S. vs. Europe” dynamic is deeply intertwined with the inherent flaws or vulnerabilities of democracy itself. Incidentally, it was Trump who exposed these flaws in democracy, and in that sense, I consider Trump remarkable. That is precisely why I wrote my book, The Depths of the Neo-Trump Revolution, which actively evaluates Trump.